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JURY TRIAL AND MR. JUSTICE BLACK
LEON GEENt
JuRY trial, like so many other institutions of Anglo-American law, has an
intricate history which cannot be captured in a few words. It has never re-
mained the same long enough so it could be said, "This is it, simon-pure."
Transplanted to a new environment, it begins its growth afresh, and in each
jurisdiction its development has been different. No lawyer from Texas, Arkan-
sas, North Carolina, Louisiana or Connecticut, for example, would find him-
self at home in a jury trial in any other of these states. Yet the history of jury
trial is everywhere the same-a constant struggle on the one hand to preserve
the integrity of the political ideal of laymen's justice, and the equally persistent
struggle on the other to subject the jury to strict control by the court. The con-
flict remained on uneasy though somewhat even terms as long as the trial court
retained a large measure of independence, but with the development of highly
integrated court systems under the complete dominion of appellate courts, both
trial courts and jury have fallen under the control of the higher courts, and
jury trial in current civil cases has lost most of its significance.' This shift of
power has not taken place without protest by many strong judges, and among
these none has been more effective in preserving the American jury's orthodox
power than has Justice Black.
THE SHIFT OF PONWER TO APPELLATE CouRTs
Perhaps the stoutest strand of jury trial is its political significance. Its original
function was in giving support to the King's administrative officials, and later
to his traveling justices in their efforts to extend the jurisdiction of the King's
courts throughout England. It was a big factor in the eventual ascendancy of
the King's courts, for it drew to the aid of the judges the strong men of the
locality, who either knew the factual background of the matters that came before
the court, or could be trusted to make reliable judgments on what they learned
from others. It thus afforded a more rational basis of doing justice than was
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1. The conclusions here summarized are drawn from the study and teaching of torts,
procedure and related subject matters over a period of some forty years. It would be
impossible to list specifically the materials from which I have drawn these conclusions.
Aside from an endless procession of judicial opinions, the great studies of Wigmore, Pound,
Millar, Thayer, Holdsworth, Plucknett, Sunderland, Morgan, Clark, Frank, Arnold and
McCormick, and the law review writings of numerous contemporaries, have each con-
tributed something to my impressions. And no doubt some years of trial and appellate
practice have given color to them. Other attempts of the writer to depict the capture of trial
court and jury by the appellate courts are found in GREEN, JUDGE AND JuRY C. 14 (1930) ;
Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 T As L. RV. 158, 273 (1954-55) ; Green, The Indi-
vidual's Protection Under Negligence Law, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 751 (1953).
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provided by the cruder methods of trial that it supplanted. Even so, the begin-
ning of jury trial was timid, and it passed only haltingly from assize and in-
quisition to fact determination based on the testimony of witnesses, and the
application of the law as given by the judge to the facts so found.
Jury trial everywhere has been a process of rough justice, never subject
successfully to great refinement, and always capable of great abuse. There has
never been a period when it was not ripe for reform. Its success has been in
honest approximation; its best services in the frontier periods of English and
American societies-in criminal cases, in land suits, in actions for debt, in civil
actions involving physical violence, in the simpler cases of fraud and in both
civil and criminal cases involving political rights. In all these cases, it has saved
trial judges difficult and embarrassing judgments and with rare exceptions has
won and held their affections.
To citizens generally, jury trial has given a sense of political freedom; a feel-
ing of being a part of government. It offers an assurance of judgment by
neighbors who understand the community climate of values, a bulwark against
the petty tyrannies of headstrong judges, and a means of softening the cold
letter of the law in cases of hardship. As political, social and economic environ-
ments have changed, jury trial has changed its character also. But even so,
these historic memories are still retained, and "we the people" insist on its
retention, if for nothing more than as a symbol of political freedom, emphasiz-
ing the dignity of the citizen and the power of the local community. Moreover,
the trial judge still finds in jury verdicts relief from making embarrassing judg-
ments and protection against the criticism that arises from an unpopular out-
come of a trial. And so we may dismiss the suggestion that jury trial will be
expurgated from our law. Even though it may become only a formalism, it is
probably an enduring watermark of the common law.
Another stout strand of jury trial is its function of determining disputed
"issues of fact" in civil cases. It has never been easy for courts to make use of
juries in the determination of law suits. No one has yet been able to isolate
issues of fact and issues of law and keep them isolated for purposes of judg-
ment, and it is even more difficult to hold a jury within the limits of their func-
tion without on the one hand restricting their power so that they cannot per-
form intelligently, or on the other hand surrendering the whole case to the jury.
And it is perhaps equally difficult to restrain the judge within the limits of his
functions. The attempt to maintain a workable equilibrium of the dual agency
of judge and jury is a long and intricate story which can only be swiftly sum-
marized here.
As long as civil cases remained simple, and the issues were in the domain
of the understanding of everyday citizens, jury trial both in England and in
this country was relatively satisfactory. But as civil cases became more com-
plex and litigation brought within its vortex the interests of an expanding
commercial and industrial economy; as the significance of these interests out-
ran the understanding of laymen; as population multiplied and became mobile,
ho that strangers infiltrated every precinct; as business activities became or-
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ganized into great enterprises that overflowed their local and even state bound-
aries; as many activities came to depend on dangerous machines that counted
their victims by the thousands; as insurance companies assumed liability and
took over the role of defense; as the experts and their methods in all the fields
of science were called upon to supply proof; and as the courts through which
the swelling tides of litigation were channelled grew in number and overlapped
in jurisdiction, many serious conflicts have arisen within the jury process.
Furthermore, selection of jurors on the basis of property, moral and educational
qualifications, and conversely, exemption of many of the best citizens from jury
service; tampering with jurors and their own misconduct; suits between local
citizens and those foreign to the community, especially where the stranger was
a corporation; suits between servants and their corporate masters; suits be-
tween the wealthy and the poor; suits between landowners and their tenants;
suits between the ethical lawyer and the one not so ethical-these and a hundred
other conflicts brought extraneous influences to bear on the jury's determina-
tion of the issues between the parties to the suit.
As these problems arose, they were met by the judges, sometimes assisted
by the legislatures, with practices devised primarily for use by the trial judge.
Among the most important, perhaps, were the early attaint of the jury for false
verdict; the special verdict in all of its variations; refinement of the pleadings
through demurrers, motions and replies, so that only a single issue remained
for trial if it could not be resolved as a matter of law; judgments notwithstand-
ing the verdict; nonsuits; directed verdicts; new trial; change of venue; remit-
tance of damages; rules for excluding, restricting or testing the testimony of
witnesses and other data for admission in evidence; detailed instructions to the
jury on the law, sometimes accompanied by comment on the facts; and many
other practices of lesser importance. Each of these practices originated in some
environment that was thought to call for control of the jury; each has an ex-
tended history all its own.
Even with these strong measures in the hands of the trial judge, jury deter-
mination of issues has never been highly dependable. Moreover, changes in
the trial process and at other points have frequently thrown control out of
kilter. Serious and lasting maladjustments have resulted from the great re-
forms which liberalized and expanded the litigation process so as to combine
matters of law and equity, and to permit the extensive joinder of causes of
action and parties, with the corresponding multiplication of defensive issues,
impleading of third parties, cross-actions and counterclaims ad infinitum. This
heavy loading of a single litigation so as to constitute a mass trial of issues has
imposed tremendous burdens on jury trial. Trials are extended in time, in-
structions are lengthy and involved, and the opportunities for error are almost
limitless. Verdicts that cannot be sustained call for new trials or provide the
basis for appeals. New rules for the submission of issues, for making and pre-
serving exceptions and for assigning errors; doctrines of harmless error; and
scores of other correctional devices do not remove the burdens or supply the
antidotes for the complexities injected into the trial by these reforms from
which so much was expected.
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The greatest relief for the trial courts has in fact come by the transfer of the
burden of responsibility to the appellate courts, and the appellate courts, in
self-defense as it were, have been compelled to evolve themselves from mere
courts for pointing out errors of law into courts of comprehensive review for
the authoritative determination of the law, and in many instances of the facts
as well. To say that this transfer in responsibility gave relief to the judicial
system would be inaccurate. Instead it has required tremendous expansion of
the system and has produced a mass of judicial decision which in itself con-
stitutes a formidable problem for both practitioners and trial courts.
Let us examine this development a little more closely. The increased com-
ple:xity in trials and the comprehensive review on the facts as well as the law
by the appellate courts have imposed a great burden on the whole court system.
The trial judge's attempts to instruct the jury on a multitude of issues within
the limitations of increasing doctrinal refinements, and at the same time to leave
the jury free to exercise their functions, are seldom faultless. Not only must
the trial courts themselves frequently grant new trial, but many cases are trans-
ferred to the appellate courts to be unscrambled and sent back for another trial.
There has been no speeding and simplifying of the disposition of cases; rather,
the dockets in both trial and appellate courts of heavily populated areas are
becoming ever more crowded. It is not unusual for a case to be before a court
from four to six times. More judges, both trial and appellate, are required;
then more courts, both trial and appellate; then more trial procedures and
more appellate procedures; then more authoritative declarations by the appel-
late courts on points of procedural and substantive law in order to bring uni-
formity in practice, and certainty in the law. Then in order to protect their
reviewing processes, the appellate courts must declare the law with the utmost
meticulousness so that the trial courts can make it effective in ruling on motions
and in their instructions to juries.
A remarkable development has taken place at this point. In tort cases for
example, the courts at first used general expressions as "reasonable care," "the
u)dinary prudent man," "under all the surrounding circumstances" and like
phrases as guiding lights for jurors. The issues were simple: negligence, con-
tributory negligence, last clear chance, causal relation and damages were the
usual inquires for jury findings. On the basis of these issues and guiding lights
the judges in many jurisdictions summarized the facts, and in some commented
i'n the v.ei-ht of the evidence. The lawyers however though this gave the trial
judge too much power over the jury and as a result of their pressure in most
states, either by statute or constitution, comment on the evidence in any form
v.as prohibited.
The courts could not and did not accept this defeat and surrender of power.
They performed an exceedingly clever maneuver. In order not to offend the
rule against comment on the weight of evidence, they simply transmuted
specific circumstances into questions of law, which of course are the raw
materials out of which rules of law are formulated. With these rules the trial
judge himself could pass judgmeht on many details and restrict the jury's
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judgment on others. Of more importance, the appellate courts were enabled
to check his judgments at every step. Good examples of what has been done
are found in the landowner categories of trespasser, licensee and invitee; in the
extensive network of causes-proximate, remote, sole, intervening and super-
vening; and in the multitude of specific rules involving presumptions, burden
of proof, res ipsa loquitur, negligence per se, unavoidable accident and a host
of other doctrinal gadgets.
Thus the appellate courts have steadily moved in on the jury's province of
determining whether "under all the circumstances" the defendant was negli-
gent, the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, or the defendant had the last
clear chance, and whether the conduct involved contributed to the plaintiff's
injury-by creating rules of law designed to control the jury's consideration of
every circumstance in a litigation. This process has so bloated these simple
issues that it is not unusual for the court to have to pass upon a multitude of
sub-issues in order to determine a single basic inquiry in a case. So it is that
principles, theories, doctrines, rules and formulas of law, procedural and sub-
stantive, have been spun and refined without limit; and there seems to be no
way to bring to an end this upward-spiralling process of lawmaking and law-
refining. To say that neither trial judge nor jury can successfully respond
through general instructions or special issues to a process so extravagantly
developed for remote control by appellate courts, is an understatement for
which I can only apologize.
It can be said with assurance that the appellate courts have now secured
control of all the essentials of jury trial. The trial judge is not much more than
a trial examiner, while the jury simply satisfies the public and professional crav-
ing for ceremonial-the necessity for dealing with simple matters as though
they were freighted with great significance. Fortunately, most cases end in
some fashion with the trial determination; otherwise the judicial process would
not work at all. But in any case in which either party wishes appellate review,
and has been forehanded enough to make a record, the judgment of the trial
court is subject to the judgment of the appellate court on the law, and on the
facts as well, if the appellate court chooses to exercise its control.
Trial by record before an appellate court, even assuming an accurate record
and conscientious review, has little resemblance to jury trial as it had developed
in Anglo-American judicial history. It is thus that the significance of jury
trial in civil cases has become so largely that of a symbol. The more trial by
record is developed, the more jury trial comes to have merely symbolic value.
Nor does trial by record serve the cause of justice to a greater advantage than
jury trial; trial by record has its dangers, also. It is rare that the "fall out"
in jury trial does not pollute a record with error. Moreover, the trial may be
recorded with the utmost fidelity, but many of its overtones and undertones
do not find their way into the record. In the trial court the case is pulsing with
life; by the time it reaches the appellate court, much of its life has leaked out
or evaporated. Again, the objectives of the two courts are somewhat dif-
ferent. In the trial court the emphasis is on justice as between the parties; in
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the appellate court it is on keeping the lines of the law straight and systematic
for justice in general. This change in emphasis may make a great deal of dif-
ference in a close case. It is only with the utmost effort, if at all, that even the
most able and patient appellate judge can bring a case back to life. And
not only has the case lost its vitality, it has taken on new elements which may
affect its disposition: new personalities; inadequate briefs, perhaps; restate-
ment and reinterpretation of the facts and the law; the wider administrative
outlook from the appellate bench; and a multitude of what are thought of as
purely incidental influences-subtle influences-which nevertheless take their
toll. Passing on the merits of a close case at long range in time and distance
and in a hushed environment is a delicate undertaking. Under the subtle at-
tacks of masterful advocates the rulings of a trial court can frequently be made
to appear wrong, unfair, or even grotesque. If the appellate court is so con-
vinced, its judicial conscience drives it to exercise some control to nullify what
looks from afar like a bad result. Unless the judge handling the case is a dul-
lard (and this is so rare that it need not be taken into account), some device
of appellate control-even resort to "the manifest weight of the evidence" -is
always at hand to further the ends of justice as they may appear, however per-
fect the record may seem on its face.
This is not an unnatural development in any hierarchy. It has required a
century to develop the current court systems of the states and the nation into
well-articulated hierarchies. And as the development has advanced, the im-
portance of jury trial and the trial judge has declined. This may or may not
be unfortunate. I do not know enough to be certain one way or the other. But
what has happened here as a result of the concentration of controls and power
in the appellate courts is not an isolated phenomenon in our culture. The same
development may be observed in the strong group controls that have resulted
from the exodus from the farms to the towns and cities; the drying up of the
country newspaper by the city newspaper; the mergers in turn of city news-
papers under a single management, and finally the consolidation of newspaper,
radio and television into chains under the domination of a relatively small
group of owners and advertisers. Our thinking and culture in many of their
important aspects tend steadily to fall under the control of a few public rela-
tions firms in our larger cities. And in fact, we observe like movements in all
the important economic and governmental affairs of our time.
All this may be an inevitable product of the American genius for organiza-
tion and the concentration of power. Whatever its ultimate explanation, the
shift of power from the trial court and jury to the appellate court-from the
local community to a centralized court system-may well deaden the adminis-
tration of the law, just as these other concentrations of power have produced
conformity in other facets of our lives. Perhaps these developments cannot
and should not be stopped. Perhaps the only escape from the excessive ex-
pense, delays, procedures and refinements of law incident to jury trial is by
shifting more and more power to the appellate courts. The open recognition
of their power and responsibility might be an exceedingly wholesome influence
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in the administration of justice. But if jury trial is to be preserved in civil
cases as anything more than a sort of preliminary examination merely formu-
lating the decisive issues for the appellate courts, heroic measures are required
to bring about a realignment of the judicial process. 2
THE SUPREME COURT AND JURY TRIAL
Efforts have been made to counteract this trend in at least one small area of
the law; their results can be seen in the more recent cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.3
For a period at least the Court has attempted to free this litigation from the
strangling doctrinal controls developed by common law appellate courts. This
has not always been the attitude of the Court in FELA cases ;4 the about-face
began about the time Justice Black came on the Court. From that time until
quite recently, writs of certiorari have been granted frequently, and the opinions
written by the majority have for the most part accorded the jury its orthodox
functions in tort litigation. 5
As has been frequently observed, the original FELA was given meaning by
common law lawyers in the spirit and often in the terms of common law doc-
trines. Contributory negligence having been denied by the Act as a defense
2. First. In personal injury and death actions, comparative negligence is an essential
formula for effective jury trial. Comparative negligence is more compatible with the com-
mon sense of the jury than the "all or nothing" attitude of common law doctrines.
Second. The real parties in interest should be brought out in the open in all litigation.
Third. The submission of cases to the jury should be upon special issues, as in North
Carolina and the English jurisdictions, and as now permitted under the federal rules, where
a few vital issues are stated in the form of questions easily comprehended by jurors, and
supported by clear instructions as to the relevant legal rules.
Fourth. The dignity and power of the trial judge should be restored. The trial judge
is the key official in the judicial process. The center of gravity should rest in the trial
bench. Good trial judges with adequate power would be enabled to reduce greatly the work
of the appellate courts and the time and expense of litigation.
Fifth. Rather than review of records by appellate courts there should be prompt local
hearings by a panel of judges whose function should be to determine whether substantial
justice has been done, and, if not, to correct the injustice. The appellate courts should
restrict review to cases involving questions of statutory and constitutional interpretation,
questions of jurisprudential policy, and matters of due process. Helpful supervision of the
administration of the trial courts would be far more valuable than all the laborious attempts
to discover refinements with which to patch the flaws found in legal doctrines and in their
application to particular cases. As the supreme authority over the operations of the judicial
process, appellate judges should find their greatest satisfaction in developing successful
administration of the law in the trial courts.
3. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
4. See New York Cent. R.R. v. Ambrose, 280 U.S. 486 (1930) ; Missouri Pac. R.R. v.
Aeby, 275 U.S. 426 (1928); Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472 (1926). See
also discussion by Justice Black in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943)
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (concurring opinion per Douglas, J.).
5. See appendix to concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Wilkerson v. MIcCartlD,
mcpra note 4, at 71,
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other than in diminution of damages, it was not difficult for the courts to con-
vert contributory negligence into assumption of risk, and thereby interpose a
complete defense to the action.6 When assumption of risk was eliminated as
a defense by the 1939 amendment to the Act,7 it was not difficult to convert
the defense of contributory negligence or assumption of risk into the defense
of no evidence of any negligence on the part of defendant,8 or that his negli-
gence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury,9 or that plaintiff's own
negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injury.10 It was this type of
avoidance that Justice Black met head on, and with the support of a majority
of the Court put an end to, at least for a time.
In Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.," Justice Black struck his hardest and
most effective blow against the doctrine that had been employed to give the
courts, both trial and appellate, practically complete control over FELA liti-
gation and to render jury trial of little importance. The lower courts had
undertaken to distinguish between assumption of risk resulting from the em-
ployer's negligence and assumption of risk incident to the employment in the
absence of negligence by the employer. As observed in the concurring opinion
of Justice Frankfurter there is a distinction, but the distinction is ambiguous
and confusing, and should be discarded. 12 Justice Black did his best to get rid
of it. He said:
"We hold that every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of risk was
obliterated from the law by the 1939 amendment, and that Congress, by
abolishing the defense of assumption of risk in that statute, did not mean
to leave open the identical defense for the master by changing its name to
'non-negligence.' "13
This case was quickly followed by Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry.,14 in which
it had been held by the Vermont Supreme Court that the evidence was insuffi-
6. See discussion by Justice Black in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54
(1943).
7. 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1952).
8. DeZon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 661 (1943). In his dissent in this
case Justice Black protested: "When we consider the weight of the evidence and resolve
doubtful questions such as these, we invade the historic jury function." Id. at 674. In his
dissent in Stewart v. Southern Ry., 315 U.S. 283, 287 (1942), Justice Black said: "Respect
for the institution of trial by jury should, in my judgment, prompt us to leave undisturbed
the jury's finding in this case that the coupler was defective. Because it must rely on the
written page rather than living words, an appellate court can never fully appreciate the
effect of testimony heard by a jury of local citizens." Ibid. See also Moore v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 340 U.S. 573 (1951) ; Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R.R., 335 U.S. 329 (1948).
9. Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 336 U.S. 207 (1949) ; Lavender v. Kurn, 327
U.S. 645 (1946); Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry., 321. U.S. 29 (1944); Brady v.
Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476 (1943).
10. Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949); Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S.
53 (1949).
11. 318U.S. 54 (1943).
12. Id. at 68.
13. Id. at 58.
14. 319 U.S. 350 (1943).
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cient to raise an issue of defendant's negligence, even though a jury had found
negligence. The Supreme Court through Justice Douglas reversed, holding
that an issue had been raised.15 Shortly thereafter, in Tennant v. Peoria &
Pekin Union Ry.,' 6 the issue was whether the death of deceased resulted from
the negligence of the defendant in failing to give warning of the movement of
a train. The trial court's judgment based on a jury verdict had been set aside
by the circuit court of appeals. The opinion was given by Justice Murphy, who
said in part:
"It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting
circumstantial evidence in order to take the case away from the jury on
a theory that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain
inferences. The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the
particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury. It is the jury, not
the court, which is the fact-finding body. It weighs the contradictory evi-
dence and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses, receives expert
instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The very
essence of its function is to select from among conflicting inferences and
conclusions that which it considers most reasonable .... That conclusion,
whether it relates to negligence, causation or any other factual matter,
cannot be ignored. Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set
aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different
inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are
more reasonable. ' ' 17
Here in three closely related decisions, each with its dissents, the pattern of
jury trial was restored to a determination of the three basic issues of a tort
case-negligence of the defendant, causal relation between the defendant's neg-
ligent conduct and the injury, and the amount of damages-each a jury ques-
tion if there is any basis for reasonable minds to differ in reaching a conclusion
on the issue. It may be observed in passing that the "proximate cause" issue
in this and other cases under the statute is restricted to causal relation "in
whole or in part.' 8 The endless and useless confusion developed by many of
the common law courts about the term "proximate cause" is sedulously
avoided.'"
15. See also Stone v. New York, C. & St. L.R.R., 344 U.S. 497 (1953) ; Willis v. Union
Pac. R.R., 329 U.S. 649 (1947); Jesionowski v. Boston & M.R.R., 329 U.S. 452 (1947).
16. 321 U.S. 29 (1944).
17. Id. at 35. See also Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645 (1946). Judge Jerome Frantz
dissenting in Cahill v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 224 F2d 637, 640 (2d Cir. 1955), said:
"I assume, arguendo, that the inference needed to support the verdict would not suffice in
a suit not brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. But the more rccent
Supreme Court decisions make it clear that, under that Act, the jury's power to draw
inferences is greater than in common-law actions."
There would seem to be no justification for this attitude. It merely reflects how far the
courts have gone in other areas of litigation in restricting, if not denying, the jury's
orthodox common law function to draw inferences.
18. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952).
19. See the excellent discussion of the term by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54, 66 (1950). See also Coray v. Southern
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In other respects as well Justice Black and his associates have protected the
right of jury trial under the FELA and supporting acts from attrition. In
Duncan v. Thompson 20 an employee had accepted an advance of $600 from
the defendant on condition that if a settlement could not be reached and the
employee brought suit he must first return the $600. He brought suit without
doing so. Meeting the defense based on the agreement, Justice Black reversed
the Missouri court and held the agreement void under section 5 of the Act as a
method of exempting defendant from liability.21 He failed in his attempt to
eliminate the defense of assumption of risk under the "free pass" agreement,22
but more recently he and his colleagues invalidated a contract restricting the
choice of venue for an action based upon the FELA.2 3
Justice Black has been equally vigorous in protecting jury trial from doc-
trinal limitations that the state courts have sought to impose. In Garrett v.
Moore-McCornzack Co.,24 he rejected the Pennsylvania rule that the burden
of proof was on the employee to show by "clear, precise and indubitable" evi-
dence that a release from liability executed by the defendant and accepted by
the employee was invalid. Much later, in a somewhat similar case, 25 he like-
wise rejected an Ohio practice under which the invalidity of a release was re-
quired to be found by the judge as in equity by "clear, unequivocal and con-
vincing evidence." He stated the matter simply:
"We have previously held that 'The right to trial by jury is a basic and
fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence' and that it is
'part and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers under the Em-
ployers' Liability Act' .... It follows that the right to trial by jury is too
substantial a part of the rights accorded by the Act to permit it to be classi-
fied as a mere 'local rule of procedure' for denial in the manner that Ohio
has here used.... The trial judge and the Ohio Supreme Court erred in
holding that petitioner's rights were to be determined by Ohio law and in
taking away petitioner's verdict when the issues of fraud had been sub-
mitted to the jury on conflicting evidence and determined in petitioner's
favor." 26
Pac. R.R., 335 U.S. 520 (1949) ; Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 333 U.S. 821 (1948);
Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 484 (1943) (dissenting opinion) ; Note, 31 N.C.L.
REv. 216 (1953).
20. 315 U.S. 1 (1941).
21. In an entirely different environment, Justice Black was successful in striking down
an attempted exemption of a towboat owner from liability for negligence resulting in
damage to a barge that was being towed. Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85
(1955); Boston Metals Co. v. The Winding Gulf, 349 U.S. 122 (1955). Likewise, in
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), his opinion broke the back of state statutes denying
actions in local courts for wrongful deaths occurring outside the local jurisdiction.
22. Francis v. Southern Pac. R.R., 333 U.S. 445, 451 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
23. Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 338 U.S. 263 (1949), reversing per curiam,
321 Mich. 693,33 N.W.2d 120 (1948).
24. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
25. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
26. Id. at 363.
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In Brown v. Western Ry. the Georgia court had sustained a demurrer to
plaintiff's complaint under a rule requiring allegations to be construed "most
strongly against the pleader." In sending the case back for trial Justice Black
said in part:
"It is contended that this construction of the complaint is binding on us.
The argument is that while state courts are without power to detract from
'substantive rights' granted by Congress in FELA cases, they are free to
follow their own rules of 'practice' and 'procedure.' To what extent rules
of practice and procedure may themselves dig into 'substantive rights' is a
troublesome question at best as is shown in the very case on which respon-
dent relies ....
"Here the Georgia court has decided as a matter of law that no inference
of railroad negligence could be drawn from the facts alleged in this case.
Rather the court itself has drawn from the pleadings the reverse inference
that the sole proximate cause of petitioner's injury was his own negligence.
Throughout its opinion the appellate court clearly reveals a preoccupation
with what it deemed to be petitioner's failure to take proper precautions....
Strict local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens
upon rights of recovery authorized by federal laws .... [S hould this Court
fail to protect federally created rights from dismissal because of over-exact-
ing local requirements for meticulous pleadings, desirable uniformity in
adjudication of federally created rights could not be achieved."' 8
In nearly all the cases in which the pattern of trial in FELA cases was
developed by Justice Black and the majority of the Court there were vigorous"
dissents. One of the arguments urged by the dissenters was that the writs of
certiorari in such cases were improvidently granted; the Court had more im-
portant business than keeping the common law doctrines of negligence aligned
for so many state and federal courts and it was entirely too burdensome for the
Court to be compelled to canvass the record for errors in the application of
such doctrines where application depended so greatly on the judgment of the
particular court. Justice Frankfurter put the point sharply in his dissenting
opinion in Stone v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. :20
27. 338U.S.294 (1949).
28. Id. at 296, 298-99.
In another context Justice Black has carried his concern for the trial court's in-
tegrity and its freedom from the overlordship of the appellate court to an extreme that
many critics consider wholly unjustifiable. The point involved is the construction of FED.
R. CIv. P. 50(b) so as to forbid the entry of a judgment n.o.v, by the appellate court in
absence of a motion to that end duly presented to and passed upon by the trial court. The
matter came to a crux in Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48 (1952), where
the failure to make the motion in the trial court seems a trivial procedural technicality in-
deed. But in view of the note appended by Justice Black as to the practice in the Second
Circuit the point is not as flimsy as it would otherwise seem, and if not insisted upon it
could well have widened a breach in the practice which would have materially broadened
the appellate power. Id. at 54 n.3. This is not to argue that the appellate court should not
have the power, but merely to emphasize the devotion of Justice Black to the cause of the
trial court's integrity, and his consistency in guarding it from further inroads. But see
Justice Frankfurter's sharp dissent, id. at 54; see also CLARK, CODE PLEADING 71 (2d ed.
1947).
29. 344 U.S. 407 (1953).
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"When it thus put the enforcement of the law in the keeping of State
courts, the Congress knew that the determination of whether there is ade-
quate evidence to sustain a claim of negligence is one of the most elusive
determinations that judges are called upon to make." 30
Another argument, stressed especially by Justice Frankfurter, is that the
concept of negligence as a working principle for modern industry is outmoded
and thould be replaced by the principle of insurance that underlies workmen's
compensation laws.31 Apparently his idea is that by refusing to take cognizance
of the maladministration of FELA cases the Supreme Court will prompt Con-
g-ress to provide a better remedy more quickly.
These arguments are not without weight. The Supreme Court of the United
States is a public law court.32 Perhaps little justification can be found for im-
posing upon it the supervisory administration of the tort litigation arising
under the several acts providing protection for workmen engaged in interstate
and foreign commerce against physical injuries and death. But until arrange-
ment can be made for supervision by some other court, or for some more ade-
quate form of protection,33 it is unthinkable that the protective acts of Congress
.hall be left to the administration of some sixty separate far-flung systems of
state and intermediate appellate federal courts with their differing doctrinal
networks of negligence law and their divergent attitudes towards the purposes
30. Id. at 412. See also Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 364 (1951)
(disscnting opinion) ; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 64 (1949) (concurring
opinion) ; Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
31. Carter v. Atlanta & St. A.B. Ry., 338 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1949): "To apply the'
concepts of 'negligence' and 'proximate cause' to the infinite complexities of modern indus-
try is like catching butterflies without a net."
32. Currently little common law tort litigation comes before the Court. A few recent
cases, however, indicate Justice Black's keen understanding of common law tort theory.
His dissent in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 268 (1946) (damage to respondent's
chicken farm by low-flying government planes held to be an unconstitutional taking of pri-
vate property) is most compelling, and its rejection can be accounted for only by the
absence at that time of a Federal Tort Claims Act. Likewise the dissent of Justice Jackson
(joined by Justice Black) in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 47 (1953) (govern-
ment held not liable under the Tort Claims Act for the Texas City disaster) seems so con-
clusive in its reasoning that it is difficult to account for the decision except on the ground
that the majority was staggered by the exaggerated liabilities presented by the claimants.
Justice Black's position in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (gov-
ernment cannot sue in tort for injuries to soldier in the absence of congressional authoriza-
tion) was a surprise to many observers. The reasons given by the majority with whom he
joined are distressingly flimsy. The Court may have felt that because the government could
not be sued in tort at that time, its power to sue a private person should not be enlarged.
It may also be that the Court considered this a good case to show that it was after all a
conservative Court; that it was no longer the bad old New Deal Court that had taken so
much criticism.
33. Cf. Richter and Forer, Federal Employers' Liability Act-A Real Compensatory
Law for Railroad Workers, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 203 (1951) ; Pollack, Workwen's Compen-
sation for Railroad IVork Iniuries and Diseases, 36 id. at 236.
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of the acts.3 4 In the attempt to set a pattern simple in design, orthodox in
theory, and easy of administration by trial courts, Justice Black and his col-
leagues of the majority have achieved at least a momentary success. 35 But
nothing less than constant vigilance on the part of the Court can prevent a
resurgence of appellate domination of the jury's function in the administration
of the acts.3 6
34. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Anderson, 221 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1955)
Wetherbee v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 204 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Gill v. Pennsylvania R.R..
201. F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Walker v. Lykes S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1952), 62
YALE L.J. 111. The administration of the state courts is even more erratic.
35. Fortunately there are other devoted guardians of jury trial and of the integrity of
trial courts to be found in the state and federal systems. Outstanding among these is
Justice Carter of the California Supreme Court, whose opinions are probably unequaled
for their sturdy advocacy of jury trial. And the scholarly and articulate Judge Jerome
Frank of the Second Circuit, although he would like to see jury trial eliminated by con-
stitutional amendment, at least in civil cases, never ceases to urge the overwhelming im-
portance of the facts in every litigation, and the exclusive power of the jury, under existing
constitutional provisions, to evaluate the facts. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d
54 (2d Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 665 (2d Cir.
1946). But such judges are rare and they may well be the last great judges who intelligently
fight the battle for the jury. For the power of organization, the volume and haste of the
flow of business, and the mesh of doctrine are steadily and remorselessly taking jury trial
(except for the formality) out of play as a mechanism for the protection of the individual's
rights in civil matters.
36. It will be observed how the recently improved doctrine of forum non conveniens,
62 STAT. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952), is already upsetting the equilibrium of
litigation under the FELA. As a delaying tactic it has few equals; as a conwrol of jury
trial its significance is unfathomable. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955) ;
Missouri ex rel. So. Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); Richter & Forer, Proposed
Changes in the Laws Governing Infuries in Interstate Transportation, 67 HARV. L. REV.
1003, 1012 (1954) ; Comments, 29 IND. L.J. 97 (1953), 52 MIcH. L. Rxv. 1211, 39 Mix.
L. Rsv. 115 (1954).
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